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NOTES AND COMMENT
than he is entitled to receive. For instance, if his mortgage were
a small one in proportion to the value of the property, he would
collect the full amount of the damage even though it greatly ex-
ceeded his lien on the property. That would obviously be unwise
and unfair.
A recent Massachusetts decision would seem to sustain the ma-
jority decision in the case at hand.
Thus it will be seen that a mortgagee may recover when his
interest is insured in a policy taken out by the mortgagor, paid for
by the mortgagor, and which may be cancelled by the mortgagor.
The courts, in allowing him to recover, proceed not on the ground
of indemnity but rather on the theory that the insurance company
is bound by contract to pay the amount of the loss to him. Indeed
it would be difficult to justify the recovery on the grounds of
indemnity.
RUDOLPia L. LONDNER.
IS AN ENGAGEMENT RING AN ABSOLUTE GIFT?
If a ring is presented to a woman after an engagement is en-
tered into and the woman refuses to marry the man, can he recover
the ring? This proposition was before the court in Beck v. Cohen,
an Appellate Division decision, First Department, reported in the
Law Journal March 16, 1933. In that case the plaintiff pleaded that
in consideration of the defendant's promise to marry him, he agreed
to marry her and delivered to her an engagement ring in anticipa-
tion of their marriage and conditioned upon the fulfillment by the
defendant of her agreement to marry him. After having plighted
her troth and received the ring, the defendant refused to marry him,
although he stood ready and willing to perform the agreement, and
she has declined to return the engagement ring to him upon his de-
mand and continued to retain it to his damage. The plaintiff met
with a dismissal of his complaint on the ground that it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On appeal, he
was allowed, in a three-two decision, to recover his ring. The con-
sequence of that decision is that new law has been laid down re-
versing the leading case on the subject, Rosenberg v. Lewis.1
In that case, the facts of which are substantially the same as
the principal case, except that valuable pieces of jewelry were given
and not an engagement ring in particular, the Court said:
"Assuming that there was a promise of marriage and that
relying upon that promise plaintiff presented gifts to defen-
'Silver v. United States Trust Co., Mass. Adv. Sh. 1589, 182 N. E. 372(1932).
1210 App. Div. 690, 206 N. Y. Supp. (1st Dept. 1924).
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dant which she now refuses to return, we are not warranted
in concluding that the gifts were given upon condition that
they would be returned if defendant refused to keep her
promise. Gifts of the kind referred to may be conditionally
made, but to state a cause of action for their recovery the
complaint must allege facts to show that there was an under-
standing that they were so presented to the donee. Where
an unconditional gift is made, title passes to the donee and
its return may not be enforced by the donor. The complaint
fails to show that defendant knew that any such condition
attached to the gifts and that she agreed to return them if
she failed to marry plaintiff."
The Court then refers to Stromberg v. Rubenstein,2 in which
an infant was the defendant. In that case it was held that the plain-
tiff knew when he gave the ring to defendant that he was parting
with all dominion over the property.
It follows from the Stromberg a and the Rosenberg 4 cases,
where under the circumstances in the principal case there had been
no expression of the intention of the parties, that the most likely
inference is that there was an absolute gift. A gift or delivery of
any indicia or token of friendship or affection must be governed by
the intention of the donor and donee as of the time it is made. It
may be that at the time of the presentation of an engagement ring
a man cannot be expected to say what he means or do what he in-
tends, and that his mental faculties are at the time, totally, disjointed.
Nevertheless, we must, in our spiritual, as well as economic and so-
cial conduct, be precise in our intent, so that we do not mislead and
deceive. The intention can only be diagnosed and determined by
either a certain definite writing, clearly setting forth a conceived
purpose, or by some acts which reveal a particular design.
Where an act may be productive of the possibility of an equivo-
cal interpretation, it is the better rule that the parties be left to fix
their intent by contract, oral or written, rather than to set up an
arbitrary implication in law. Consequently, the parties will be held
responsive to their prudence and caution when arranging the mar-
riage contract, and neither will be lulled into a false misunder-
standing.
The Rosenberg 5 case is not too strict. It does not hold that
the condition cannot be implied but, rather, states that where an ex-
press understanding is lacking some acts must be shown to explain
or indicate that the parties intended the gift to be conditional.
On the other hand, if we assume that in the great majority of
cases the ring is returned, it might well be argued that such was
2 19 Misc. 647, 44 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1897).
'Supra note 1.
'Supra note 2.
'Supra note 1.
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the intention of the parties. If this is the proper inference of fact
there seems no reason or policy why the intention should not be
carried out. But it is difficult to find a legal basis for the recovery
of the ring.
In Jacobs v. Davis 6 it has been held that an engagement ring
is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of marriage, and that
if the recipient break the contract she should return the ring. This
view seems to be in accord with the history of betrothal gifts.7
But if we construe it as a pledge, plaintiff could recover if he
had broken the contract provided he paid damages for the breach.8
This is carrying it very far since it seems probable from a review
of the authorities that unless the defendant has broken the contract,
the plaintiff would not recover. 9 A similar difficulty arises if the
theory of ordinary bailment is adopted 10 Another basis for recov-
ery is suggested in a case where money has been advanced by plain-
tiff to defendant to purchase a trousseau. It was held "- that upon
the defendant's breach of the contract to marry, plaintiff could re-
cover in assumpsit. While the reasoning in this case is confused,
the basis of the opinion seems to be that of conditional gift. It has
been held 12 that there cannot be a gift of personalty on condition
subsequent. But there seems no reason in -the nature of things why
there could not be such a gift and there is authority for holding it
valid.'3 It would seem that this theory affords the most satisfac-
tory basis for an action at law.
In Robinson v. Cumntnings 14 where suit was brought for the
value of a present given to a lady who afterwards married another
the Lord Chancellor concluded that if a person has made his ad-
dresses to a lady for some time, upon a view of marriage, and upon
reasonable expectation of success makes presents to a considerable
value and she thinks proper to deceive afterwards, it is very right
that the presents themselves should be returned or the value of them
allowed to him, but, where presents are made only to introduce a
person to a woman's acquaintance and by means thereof to gain her
favor, such person is looked upon only in the light of an adven-
turer, especially where there is a disproportion between the lady's
fortune and his and, therefore, like all other adventurers, if he will
run risks, and loses by the attempt, he must take it for his pains.
This case has been followed constantly in other jurisdictions,
yet it is nothing but a display of language and an arbitrary distinc-
62 K. B. 532 (1917).
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.) 366.
aGOODEVE, PERSONAL PROPERTY (5th ed.) 28.
'Robinson v. Cummings, 2 Atk. 409 (1742); FONBLANQUE, EQUITY (3d
ed.) 6.
a' See Recent Decision (1918) 18 HARV. L. REV. 174.
"Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 AtI. 279 (1890).
"Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370 (N. Y. 1867).
'Blanchard v. Sheldon, 43 Vt. 512 (1871); CHILDS, PERSONAL PROPERTY
§228; supra note 8; THORNTON, GIFTS AND ADVANCEMENTS §94.
"* Supra note 9.
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tion. It would seem that it is as necessary for a man to bestow
gifts upon his fiancee to hold her favor as to win her favor.
We think that the latest word on the proposition, namely, the
principal case, Beck v. Cohen,15 is good law. It seems to be a good
solution of the problem. The defendant is allowed to set up as an
affirmative defense and counterclaim that the plaintiff misled her
by falsely representing to her that he was a man of considerable
means, in possession of sufficient moneys with which to support her
in the event of their marriage and to provide and furnish an apart-
ment for their prospective home, and also that he was engaged in
a business in which he had invested considerable money so that
he would be able, from the returns of that business to support the
defendant in the event of their marriage; that these representations
upon which she relied in promising to marry him were discovered
to be false after she had in reliance upon them proceeded to make
the necessary preparations for her marriage and expended in that
connection a sum in excess of the value of the ring; and upon dis-
covering their falsity she repudiated the agreement, and declined to
wed the plaintiff. The defendant had a right to repudiate upon
discovery of the plaintiff's fraudulent purpose, and he should not
be permitted to reclaim his gift, for he 'is the one whose conduct
prevented the marriage, and her refusal to perform is justified. The
gift being conditional, the donor would by his conduct have rendered
it impossible for the condition to be performed and therefore not
be entitled to recover the ring.
The trend of judicial opinion seems to be leaning towards aban-
donment of the policy of the law to consider marital contracts as
one of special caste. Here we have a marriage contract treated in
exactly the same manner as one of commercial character, with its
defenses and counterclaims of fraud. It seems that the philosophy
of the courts today is that woman is taking her place with man today,
economically, politically and socially and therefore she should take
it judicially. She no longer needs greater protection of the law.
The recent Shonfeld case 16 in which a man was allowed an annul-
ment of his marriage on the ground of the defendant's fraudulent
misrepresentations as to her financial status, and the recent agita-
tion for legislation concerning the alimony laws are indicative of
the present attitude of the legislature and the courts towards marital
contracts.
ROSE L. LIPMAN.
CONFESSIONS-FELONY MURDER.
The courts of New York in the administration of criminal
justice are bound by legislative enactment and judicial interpreta-
tion to extend to an accused all possible safeguards for his protec-
" N. Y. L. J., March 15, 1933, at 1507.
"1260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933).
